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Abstract The modern  usage of  the  words  astronomy and astrology is  traced back to  distinctions, 
largely ignored in recent scholarship. Three interpretations of celestial phenomena (in a geometrical, a 
substantialist and a prognostic form) coexisted during the Hellenistic period. From Plato to Isidore of 
Seville, the semiotic contrast is evidenced and its later developments are sketched. The concept of 
astronomy is found to be rather constant and distinct from changing views about astrology.
The contemporary cultural context allows to easily distinguish between astronomy and 
astrology.  When  needed,  some  discourse  on  physics  is  wedged  between  the  two  and  it 
contrasts them, bringing support for the first but not for the second. This strategy turns out to 
be problematic in earlier times as an inverted situation appears there: physics founds astrology 
while  astronomy  is  taken  to  be  purely  hypothetical.  Language  considerations  point  that 
today’s  astrology has appropriated the name of its  founding knowledge.  A statement  that 
before the Modern Times no clear difference was made between astronomy and astrology is 
perhaps trivial but its explicitation is not really straightforward. Three conceptualisations of 
the  celestial  realm  are  found  under  the  two  names,  which  breeds  complications  and 
confusions.
In ancient texts sometimes one (or the other) word is used for both disciplines but no 
evidence appears for any inversion of the two names. This suggests that our word usage is not 
a convention but rather the outcome of an unstated tradition and the alleged indistinction 
might be only lexical. For the scholastics or even in the early Middle Ages the existence of 
two  words  implies  existence  of  two  realia  and  for  all  concerned  the  ‘right’  semantic 
coordination  was  not  a  problem.  The  person involved  in  celestial  science  is  always  an 
“astrologer” as if the nomos was among the stars themselves while their logos is a knowledge, 
needing an agent. Indeed the figure of the astronomer with his appellation is a late comer. 
Writing his monumental  studies in history of science,  Pierre Duhem chose to oppose two 
kinds  of  practitioners  of  celestial  science  and  labelled  them  either  ‘astronomes’  or 
‘physiciens’ restricting the traditional ‘astrologer’ to superstitious astrology. Useful as it was, 
this  tripartite  division was just a methodological  one,  relying on contemporary views and 
word usage. In order to distinguish the physical from metaphysical content, or rather positivist 
phenomenism from metaphysical  fancy he  proposed  ‘saving  the  phenomena’  as  a  slogan 
under which the ‘astronomes’ were seen to be laboring1. However the expression appears to 
be of a rather late coinage, just as the ‘astronomer’ and his whole reconstruction might seem 
to be somewhat arbitrarily imposed.
Classical studies since the 19th century  have asserted indiscriminately  equivalence 
between ‘astronomy’ and ‘astrology’2 even if lots of cases, read with regard to intention and 
content, just as Duhem did, disagree with this affirmation. The two words could be found to 
denote  different  disciplines  and  many  ancient  writers,  at  least  those  concerned  by  the 
distinction, used them knowingly. From Plato to Kepler, the coexistence for two millennia of 
a synonymic pair with similar word form would be a puzzling fact and just one occurrence of 
1 ‘Σοζειν τα φαινόμενα’ became the title of Duhem’s book (1908) but the historical adequacy of the locution has 
been contested (Goldstein 1997).
2 Asserted in various reference works such as  Daremberg  and Saglio’s Dictionnaire, Lewis and Short Latin 
Dictionary or Smith et al.,  A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. A Seminal paper by Pines (1964) 
challenged the received view. Recently Bowen (2007) considered an earlier instance,  bypassing however the 
word usage.
contamination seems to have been recorded.3. At the closing of the middle ages for rhetorical 
or ideological purposes the confusion might have been willful, betraying indeed a rather clear 
grasp  of  the  issue.  Not  only  historians  but  translators  also  have often  made ‘correct’ 
substitutions, relying on their own judgment and thus obscuring further the distinction which 
is still present in the original texts.
The mastering of the calendar  in  times,  when almost  nobody could write  and few 
people were able to count up to ten, has probably been deemed a prodigy.  It embodies a 
precise foreknowledge of the sun’s observable behaviour and, albeit imprecisely, relates it to 
sesonal  happenings  in  nature.  Different  extrapolations  were  bound to  appear.  Babylonian 
scribes  have  left  a  remarkable  collection  linking  the  ‘day  to  day’  configuration  of  the 
nocturnal sky to various earthly happenings and it is just a small testimony for their obsession 
with  any  kinds  of  omens.  Recordings  of  the  form  ‘when  x,  occurrence  of  y’  were 
accumulated,  their  content  ranging  from the  trivial  to  the  impossible.  Exhaustion, as the 
degree zero of method, is not absurd in a world supposed to be finite - the spirit is truly 
positive even if it is also totally uncritical. For cyclic phenomena discovering their periods 
amounts to complete knowledge. Lack of causality, however, is a negative fact which practice 
does not reveal, so the Babylonians achieved actually a prediction of celestial omens but not 
of their  apodoses,  which remained as  lists  of  precedents. In  a  similar  fashion the Greeks 
composed  their  parapegma  –  meteorological  recordings  for  each  day  of  the  year,  but, 
understandably,  as  weather  forecasters  they  did  not  achieve  any  success.  Explaining  the 
failure lead them to accept a difference in essence between the sublunar world and the higher 
realm. Thus Aristotle’s decision to prescribe separate sciences for them eludes the problem by 
dividing it - a seemingly Cartesian gesture. However this splitting produced as a side effect 
what came to be known as astrology.
1 Plato or Aristotle: astronomy or astrology
Plato’s  discussion  of  the  disciplines  in  the  Republic  (527d-530d) includes  the 
statement  that geometry starts with planar figures and next it  proceeds to solids and their 
movements  which  is  properly  the  concern  of  astronomy (αστρονομία).  The  beginning  of 
Aristotle’s Physics neatly confronts Plato’s conception: the enumeration (194a7) of ‘sciences 
inverse of geometry’ runs through optics, harmony and astrology (αστρολογία). There is no 
doubt about his meaning,  as various translations unanimously testify,  but using a different 
word emphasizes the difference. Plato goes on by mentioning how astronomy could be useful 
for  navigation  but  points  that  we  should  be  concerned  with  ‘genuine  astronomy’. 
Symmetrically, Aristotle (Post.  Anal.  I.13,  79a) remarks that astrology is both ‘nautical and 
mathematical’ and here as elsewhere he uses expressedly that word.'. A similar distinction is 
also found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia when he incidentally remarks that travelling needs a 
certain ‘practical knowledge of astrology’ while knowing the movements outside the earthly 
orb is ‘knowledge of astronomy’  (Mem.  IV..7, 4-5).  In Plato’s works the word astronomy 
occurs at least twenty times, but his texts never had a role comparable to Aristotle’s and it is 
only  with  the  Neoplatonists,  some  time  after  Ptolemy,  that  his  term  regains  a  wider 
circulation.  Porphyry wrote then an  Introduction to astronomy and following his mentor’s 
usage he mentioned that Pythagoras had learned ‘geometry and astronomy’  (Vita Pyth.11). 
This usage was severly eclipsed by Aristotle’s teachings: Eudemos’ History of Astrology had 
appeared in his lifetime and the term was adopted by all Peripatetics and the later Stoics. 
The first explanation of the sun’s movement as resulting from two rolling circles was 
apparently proposed within the Pythagorean school but Plato has been credited as the author 
of a full blown programme. According to Simplicius, he has proposed that the wandering of 
3 ‘astrolomie’ in Marco Polo’s Il Milione (chap. cxxxix); the word being used for a man who made a prediction 
the planets is only apparent while their true movements are just a combination of uniform 
circular  rotations.  For  this  step  from  the  phenomenal  to  the  noumenal  Plato  adduced 
arguments  and  restrictions  appealing  to  perfection,  divinity  and  other  ideological  bias. 
Eudoxus’ system came as a first realisation of the  proposal,  an  event  notable  enough to 
provide  a  watershed  between  astronomy  and  astrology.  Aristotle  took  to  reintepret 
realistically and quasi-physically the construction that was generated theoretically - language 
itself  reminding us here what was its origin4.  Rather symptomatic,  it  was not done in the 
books ‘about the heaven’ or ‘physics’ but in the  Metaphysics. Knowledge for Aristotle is a 
knowledge  of  causes  and  movement  needs  one.  In  order  to  build  a  mechanically  causal 
explanatory model  he introduced  a  few more  ‘unrolling’  spheres  which allowed to  avoid 
unwanted transmission of movements. The centre of the system, which was originally just a 
geometrical point, has gained the status of a most important place in the universe. However 
around that time it became known that a combination of epicycle and deferent offered the best 
explanation which included rotations about different points. Awareness that is equivalent to 
eccentric orbits may have occurred to Hipparchus or somebody else and thus Aristotle’s view 
clashed openly with the astronomic programme. A compromise was sought by declaring that 
models which are not strictly geocentric are just hypothetical or fictional. The better fit to 
observational data was devaluated and ‘saving the phenomena’ became the catch phrase for it. 
In this unfortunate category went Herakleides’ semi-heliocentric model, Aristarchus’ system 
and  much  later  Copernicus’  as  presented  in  the  Wittenberg  interpretation.  The  physics 
invented by Aristotle took enough hold of reality to combat the earlier geometry and claim to 
be true. Actually it was only Kepler who conceived the New Astronomy, Based upon Causes 
as it was announced in the title of his book (see below note 15). Indeed the causes are accounted 
for in Newton’s mechanics which reproduces easily the phenomenology of the solar system. 
But even Newton refused to feign some hypothesis about the cause of gravity. The issue was 
solved  later  by  introducing  material  fields,  the  same  idea  being  already  upheld  by  stoic 
thinkers  who boldly  asserted  that  ‘causes  are  bodies’.  Peripatetism and stoicism strongly 
favored  substantial-causal  explanations  and  geocentrism  remained  despite  the  clash  with 
astronomical data. 
The debate about celestial events extends to their  consideration in the sublunar orb: 
even if  it  was heterogeneous the World is  still  a whole.  Causal interaction,  when viewed 
qualitatively, can  be  traced  indefinitely  far  and  this  is  what  the  fatalistic  stoics  did.  The 
difference between the effects of the Sun and Moon and those of the other planets is only in 
degree, not in essence, and no reason to exclude them from consideration can be adduced. An 
other principle was upheld to cut the endless causal interactions – the self-evident freedom of 
the will. The occasion for this development was the coming into fashion of the Babylonian 
divinatory practice.  The signs of gods’ will,  which they read,  would be reified into astral 
influence by Greek thinking.
2 The Babylonian connection
4 It  would be almost  a  tautology to point  that  astronomy is  the first  ‘theoria’  – a  way of  seeing.  Aristotle 
approach is meta-physic as he proposed to explain what is seen: a separate realm with its own laws. Nature, or 
‘physis’, for him consists in generations and corruptions explained by the four elements but above the Moon 
there is a fifth substance. One is tempted to describe the appropriate science, astrology, which inevitably relies 
on  earthly  logic  and  analogies,  as  literally  super-natural  or  at  least  para-physical  (the situation  is  further 
complicated by viewing the soul also as a substance; interestingly, renaissance alchemy will be called sometimes 
‘astronomia inferior’).
It is a mainly matter of speculation what Plato or Aristotle (and Eudoxus)5 knew about 
Babylonian lore as its appropriation becomes perceptible only after  Alexander’s conquest. 
This is indeed the problem: why did this foreign practice come to proeminence so lately? 
Obviously, it is the conjuncture of accumulated knowledge and a flow of new information 
which  provides  a  solution.  This  amounts  to  agree  with  a  conclusion  which,  despite  its 
numerous statements, still comes as surprise: astrology, as we know it, has been invented by 
the  Greeks.  Historical  investigations lead  to  this  view6 but  also  consideration  of  its  own 
working and valuations7. 
The first attested linking of an individual’s birth with astral recordings – a horoscope- 
is in cuneiform writing, on a tablet dating from 405BE when Greeks were already speculating 
on astral matters.  Keeping to the contemporary usage we could ask of what kind were the 
celestial concerns of Babylonian at that times.  There is an obvious contrast but it would be 
totally unjust to assert that they were purely astrological. Rather the obverse, one may state 
that  they  actually  discovered  astronomy;  it  is  commonly  admitted  that  Pythagoreism 
developed  into  mathematical  science  and  obviously  a  similar  process  could  lead  to  the 
appearance  of  astronomy  on  the  baylonian  kingdom8. The  indebtedness  to  superstition, 
religion or myth would not be greater that the one inherited from Plato and Aristotle who took 
for granted the divinity of planets. Tabulating astronomical data, using ecliptic coordinates, a 
numerical system based on 60 with a marking for zero are elements of a discipline which 
surpasses in rigor and precision most Greek endeavours. Stellar data are the main content of 
Babylonian horoscopes while their interpretation is sketchy, relying on annals and tradition 
(Rochberg  F.,  1998).  A transfer  to  Greece  would  mean  to  carry  over  this  part  which  is 
algorithmically irreducible. The general idea however is easily transmissible and the Greek 
implemented it with their own means. A similar instance would be the development leading 
from common law to roman law, both being practices to achieve a particular aim. Of course 
this inversion - astronomy being Babylonian while astrology is Greek - does not really matter, 
except for the perspective which the participants could have had. For historical purposes one 
might  just as well agree with Philo of Alexandria who says that Chaldeans invented both 
‘astronomy and genethlialogy’9 .
So, celestial science in Ptolemy’s time is conceived in three main interpretations: the 
first, a Pythagorean one, as geometry, the second one, physicalist and substantial was inspired 
by  peripatetism  and  a  last  one,  prognostical,  attributed  to  the  Chaldeans. The earlier 
‘astronomy’ steps back before the later ‘astrology’, while the newcomer still needs a name. It 
is called descriptively by referring to its alleged originators, the Chaldeans, or known as 
‘apotelesmatics’ and, more particularly, as ‘genethlialogy’ or ‘katarkhe’.  For Latin authors, 
and for anybody not involved in this, the distinction between Pythagorean, peripatetic or 
Babylonian views would have been rather elusive.  What is more, Babylonian tables allowed 
preparation of horoscopes and celestial prognostication without any grasp of astronomy. Any 
‘astronomer’  could  and  did  the  same,  so  the  profession  denomination  is  ‘astrology’  and 
5 The Timaeus offers privides grounds for some acquaintance to be acknowledged while Aristotle’s remarks 
remain in a naturalistic vein; according to an uncorroborated remark in Cicero, (De Div., ii, 42, 87), Eudoxus 
demanded that 'no credence should be given to the Chaldeans, who predict and mark out the life of every man 
according to the day of his nativity'.
6 Neugebauer O., The Exact Sciences in Antiquity. NY Dover publications, 1969. p.80; Pingree D., Astrology in 
The Dictionary of the History of Ideas; Rochberg-Halton F., Elements of the Babylonian Contribution to 
Hellenistic Astrology, J of the American Oriental Society,  108 (1988), No. 1, p.51
7 Beck R., A brief history of Astrology, London, Blackwell, 2006
8 Today Babylonian mathematics is understood to be mostly arithmetic but, rather curiously, Josephus wrote in 
his mythical account of the Jewish Antiquities that Chaldeans learned from Abraham ‘arithmetic and astronomy’ 
(I.8.2 (166)), the usual pair of ‘geometry and astronomy’ appearing elsewhere (I.3.9 (106)).
9 De peregrinatione Abrahami 33.178; in 35.194  genethlialogy is explained briefly
correspondingly its practitioner  – the astrologer.  Before the first century latin did not use 
‘astronomy’ (exception being made perhaps for the Astronomica of the mysterious Manilius), 
as the majority of Greek had adopted astrology. The former term was still currently used as 
witnessed by the texts  of  Theon of Smyrna  or the data  collected  by Diogenes  Laertius10. 
Sextus  Empiricus  in  writing  against  the  doctores  of  his  day  notes  that  ‘Chaldeans  call 
themselves mathematici or astrologi’ and attacks their astrology or ‘mathematical art differing 
from  arithmetic  and  geometry’  and  different  from  ‘the  prognostics  of  Eudoxus  and 
Hipparchus, which some call astronomy’ (Аdv. math. V 1-2).
3 Ptolemy’s shuffle
The larger flow of history has given a Ptolemy a distinct place as he has remained for 
a millennium the authority in astronomy and even longer  in  astrology.  His  achievement 
appears  to  be  not  so  a  novelty  as  a  reconfiguration.  Instead  of  the  dilemma 
describing/explaining his work brings to the front knowledge in the form of prediction – it can 
be only more or less exact. Dеscribing the celestial movements is apodictic while tracing their 
causes or effects is just probabilistic. 
The eclecticism of the zeitgeist is perceptible in Ptolemy’s writings which comprise 
both platonic astronomy and peripatetic-stoic physics. Aristotelian astrology has always been 
something like an astral twin of sublunary valid knowledge and obviously no room is left for 
it in this mix. The return to a Pythagorean tradition is obviously and the avoidance of the 
Aristotelian term marked11. The dual hierarchy of Aristotle cosmos is replaced by a fourfold 
schema built on oppositions from the categories ‘immaterial’ and ‘invisible’ Theology is the 
science about the  immaterial and invisible, mathematics is about the  immaterial and visible 
while physics is about the material and visible. The material and invisible, which corresponds 
to the soul,  is  subsumed in physics and this  imbalance reveals  that  the really meaningful 
distinction is between ideal and material. 
The four books or  Tetrabiblos, devoted to what is today’s astrology, were known as 
Ptolemy’s Apotelesmatics  which is his own preferred term, explained as the prognostication 
by astronomy. In the celestial realm predictions are strictly true while anywhere else they are 
only  probable  -  for  meteors  or  individual  predictions.  But  a  continuously  distributed 
probability erases the opposition between sublunar and higher realms and thus invalidates the 
Aristotelian difference between astrology and physics. Lacking a proper content ‘astrology’ 
can be used for the founding and explaining of the astral influences as previously done by 
physics. And this is what really happens, but much later, when Aristotelian science is fully 
discredited.  For  the  moment  ‘astronomical  prediction’  or  some  such  paraphrasing  is 
commonly used as it is mostly taken in the same restricted sense as ‘astrologer’. Some interest 
about the star patterns when they are devoid of divinity and without a look for their effects 
would have been odd indeed. So a first modern looking definition of astrology as judging or 
predicting by the stars appears to have been given by more pragmatic Arabian commentators 
(Pines, 347) 
4 Fast  forward
Since late antiquity the quadrivium provided a context which unambiguously identifies 
astronomy  independently  of  the  word  used. Mathematics, already in a restricted sense, 
included two proper subdisciplines,  arithmetic  and geometry and they had as counterparts 
music  and  a  celestial  science.  Varro  and Martianus  Capella  still  called  it  ‘astrology’  but 
10 ‘Astronomy’ occurs at least in 4 instances, with more than 10 for ‘astrolog-er/y’; Diogenes Laertius collated 
various sources and so the word usage can appear as inverted.
11 In the Almagest none of the words appears; in the Tetrabiblos ‘astronomy’ is used 6 times and, as Feke notes, 
its only other appearance is in the Harmonics where it is defined as a mathematical science,  cf. Feke J.(2009), 
Ptolemy in Context, p.153.
Cassiodorus  adheres  strictly  to  ‘astronomy’  even if  he  might  be  referring  to  Varro’s  De 
Astrologia. The existence of two words assured medieval authors that there are two things and 
they were able to provide an educated guess as apparently Alcuin or Hugo of Saint Victor12 
did  and  they  discussed  separately  the  geometrical  Pythagorean  science  from  its  more 
substantial variants. In early 9th century Martin of Laon enumerates the disciplines from the 
quadrivium  ending  by  “astronomy  to  which  cling  astrology  and  medicine”13.  The  same 
disposition is found much later  when university education has been instituted.  Aristotle is 
taught at the theological faculty while the phenomena-saving astronomy and its astrological 
and medicinal continuation had its place at the faculty of medicine. Galileo still had to teach 
them there. Aristotle’s texts mentioning astrology became known to Western scholars a few 
centuries after they had learned from the Arab tradition about ‘judging by stars’. Liber de 
Astronomice judicandi by Roger of Hereford is an early example (ca.1184)  of astrological 
treatise presented with the words that Ptolemy might have used. Improving the calendar has 
been a prime interest of ecclesiastics and there has been an awareness that astronomical tables 
either Arabian or Babylonian offer valid data only for the location where they are computed, 
so any prognostication needs astronomy as its precondition.
Isidore of Sevilla had compiled his Etymologies, including a comment about The 
difference between astronomy and astrology which surely would not have been there if it was 
not  in some earlier  text. It is worth noting that his definition of astronomy reproduces a 
wording by Cicero who was writing about astrology,  so Isidore, or somebody before him, 
knew enough to transpose this  usage14.  Remarkably,  Isidore goes on and makes a further 
distinction which divides its topic in three parts. After separating astronomy from astrology, 
he adds that the later is ‘partly natural,  partly superstitious’, which would correspond to an 
Aristotelian and to a Babylonian concept. The  religious  qualification  here  etymologically 
speaks about ‘standing- over’ or ‘supernatural’, which is indeed what Chaldean science was. 
A  “natural  astrology”  would  have  been  for  a  peripatetic  something  of  a  contradictio  in 
adjecto, just as “celestial physics”, used in a book’s title15 much later by Kepler. Nevertheless 
the  same  text  reappears  elsewhere16,  and  the  Etymologies remained  influent  through  the 
Middle Ages, transmitting an understanding achieved already at the start of Hellenism. 
It seems safe to conclude that through the ages people who used the word astronomy 
knew  what  they  were  talking  about.  Late  medieval  and  Renaissance writers  sometimes 
stretched the term to cover most of what is astrology but such a rhetorical strategy would not 
have been possible without a prior knowledge of the difference17. Acknowledging the history 
hidden behind the name astrology leads to a clearer grasp of the ambiguities in its usage. 
12 Alcuin PL101:947 Astronomia lex astrorum, qua oriuntur et occidunt astra. Astrologia est astrorum ratio et 
natura et potestas, coelique conversio Hugo St Victor PL176:756 astronomia de lege astrorum nomen sumpsit, 
astrologia autem dicta est quasi sermo de astris disserens. Nomos enim lex et logos sermo interpretatur. (cf 
Pines).
13 Martin of Laon /Hiberniensis (819-875) Physica in quattuor divisines partitur id est arithmeticam, musicam, 
geometriam, astronomiam quibus adherent astrologia, medicina. in Insular Latin Studies ed. M.W. Herren, 
Toronto, 1981
14 Etym 3.27: Astronomia caeli conversionem, ortus, obitus motusque siderum continet, in the enumeration of 
disciplines by Cicero:.. ‘Astrologia, caeli conversio, ortus, obitus motusque siderum’ (De Oratore ii.42).
15 Astronomia nova, Αίτίολογητοσ, seu Physica coelestis translated as “New Astronomy, Based on Causes, or 
Celestial Physics” (1609)
16 PL 90, 908D, in Dubia et Spuria of Bede astronomy and astrology are named as two of the six parts pertaining 
to physics and then the same text is reproduced
17 Since the end of the 13th century there has been a discussion how much of astrology is ‘licit’: the Church and 
the secular power maintained conflicting opinions which were further complicated by the humanists’ views 
during the Renaissance. As a defender of astrology Pierre d’Ailly went as far as to write about ‘astronomy 
falsely known as astrology’ in his Tractatus de concordantia theologie et astronomie while Pico della 
Mirandola’s Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem dealt it a nearly fatal blow.
Pleonastically looking qualifications as  ‘divinatory’ or  ‘judicial astrology’ are  witnesses  of 
the distinction  from a  ‘physical’ or  ‘natural  astrology’,  an early  attempted  science  which 
became sidetracked.
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